Land of Defiance
The 2025 Bundestag election in Saxony: Around half of the voters chose the AfD. For some, this is a shift to the right; for others, it is the predictable consequence of years of disappointment.
One of the keys to understanding this lies in a psychological mechanism: when people feel that an opinion is being forced upon them, they react with defiance. Those who feel lectured eventually vote on principle against it. It is no longer necessary to identify with the chosen party. It is enough to feel: "You can't go on like this—not with me."
The East German experience—first under the authoritarian GDR regime, then through the radical upheaval of reunification—shaped a political culture that cannot be measured by West German standards. Those who grew up in a state where conformity was mandatory and honest opinions were expressed only behind closed doors developed a different sensitivity to paternalism.
After the reunification, democracy was welcomed—but it came with expectations. Of course, people wanted freedom—and of course, they didn’t yet know its price. They welcomed freedom of travel and free speech—but later realized that they also wanted to be taken seriously—something that happened too rarely.
When people protested away the so-called "old world" back then, they thought they knew what they wanted—without fully understanding what it would mean. Profound changes, new cultural techniques, the loss of the familiar—and later, the feeling of being somehow inferior, marginalized, and eventually also lectured.
Some were enthusiastic and managed to succeed within the new cultural codes. Others at least tried. A third group turned away immediately.
The fact is, at some point, parts of the East German population experienced a growing alienation, which culminated—by 2015—in a distinctly East German sentiment: When the refugees at that Budapest train station cried out "Germany, Germany," and when the then-Chancellor said, "We can do this!", many East Germans thought: "Why should we do this? What exactly are we supposed to do? We already have enough problems here! Take care of us first!"
In recent years, the feeling has solidified in East Germany that while one may vote democratically, one is not heard democratically.
A particularly revealing contradiction in this election: Migration was the main issue—but why especially in rural East German regions, where comparatively few migrants live?
This obvious contradiction shows that it’s not about personal experience, but about something more fundamental—the perception that societal change is no longer negotiable, but must conform to certain normative expectations—or not happen at all.
Those who wanted different kinds of change were portrayed as somehow "right-wing," "conspiratorial," and so on.
Many East Germans, especially under the "Ampel" coalition, also felt that identity politics was prioritized over economic necessities. The fear of social decline reinforces this feeling: "As long as the fridge is full, people can endure uncertainty. But when the wallet gets thinner, every question becomes existential." Workers in particular no longer voted SPD—but AfD.
By the time what was commonly called the "heating law" came into play, the public mood had fully shifted. Defiance grew stronger—not just because people didn’t want to be lectured anymore, but because the situation had now reached many people's wallets—and they reacted with even more disbelief to the "nonsense from Berlin."
The decisive question is: Is this merely "protest voting" for the time being, or does it mark a long-term realignment of the political landscape?
A central issue here is the so-called "firewall" against the AfD. It is supposed to prevent the party from gaining political influence. But what if the firewall has the opposite effect? The East German election results at least suggest such a possibility.
As long as the AfD is kept away from direct responsibility, it doesn’t have to prove its ability to govern. It can make promises without fulfilling them. It can polarize without facing consequences. The strategy of exclusion might, in the end, be exactly what makes it stronger.
An interesting question: What is the alternative for all those who don’t want the Ampel coalition, nor another grand coalition, nor the AfD? Where is the political force that takes voters' legitimate concerns seriously without getting lost in ideological trench warfare—or simply carrying on after elections as if nothing had happened?
The vote recently went to the CDU.
The main issue before the election: migration. After the election: new debt. Migration? Barely a word. And: The junior coalition partner chases the actual election winner ahead of it. What the SPD is now doing to the CDU, the Greens previously did to the SPD. Meanwhile, the AfD gains strength from the sidelines.
What if Germany had a new, unspent force in the center—one that is neither a continuation of Merkel’s CDU nor a reactionary response to the present? One that understands that the issues of migration, economic stability, and cultural identity are important and must be addressed substantially. One that doesn’t talk about "welcome culture" or "shut the borders," but finds pragmatic answers.
What would such a "new center" need to stand for politically? Economically liberal, socially conservative? Pro-European or nationally focused? Who could lead such a movement—and would it even be viable?
One thing is certain: What is happening in East Germany is not a passing phenomenon. It is a sign that must be understood—or ignored at one’s own risk.
The question is not so much whether the AfD will continue to gain voter support. It will—given the current coalition dynamics. The real question is whether those in power will eventually realize that it is not growing because more and more Germans suddenly embrace right-wing radicalism, but because other parties continue to ignore the truly important (= citizen-relevant) issues—and keep lecturing the electorate.